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Abstract. Growing interest in using personality variables in economic research
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to predict economic behavior. Is it reasonable to expect values on personality
scales to be predictive of behavior in economic games? It is undoubted that
personality can influence large-scale economic outcomes. Whether personality
variables can also be used to understand micro-behavior in economic games is
however less clear. We discuss reasons in favor and against this assumption and
test in our own experiment, whether and which personality factors are useful
in predicting behavior in the trust or investment game. We can also use the
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1. Introduction
Recently, a growing interest among (behavioral) economists in personality
variables can be observed (e.g., Almlund et al. (2011), Dohmen et al. (2010),
Borghans et al. (2008)). In most published studies involving personality mea-
sures so far, the Big Five personality factors are used. Usually, correlations of
the personality measures with some real-world aspects of economic behavior are
reported and interpreted, for example with earnings or performance on the job. 1
Researchers in experimental economics recently also started to include personal-
ity measures in experiments, hoping to be able to explain part of the behavioral
heterogeneity found. Many studies relate some kind of Big Five personality vari-
ables, although measured by different instruments, to behavior in games like the
Prisoner’s dilemma, dictator, or ultimatum games (e.g., Brandsta¨tter and Gu¨th
(2002), Ben-Ner et al. (2004a), Ben-Ner et al. (2004b), Swope et al. (2008)). Other
studies use more specific scales, as locus of control, self-monitoring and sensation
seeking (Boone et al. (1999)), or the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (Schmitt et al.
(2008)). Results of these exercises so far are not very conclusive.
One reason for this might lie in a methodological concern: Is it reasonable to
expect values on personality scales to be predictive of micro-behavior in economic
games? It is undoubted that personality can influence economic outcomes at large
(Ozer and Benet-Mart´ınez (2006)), such as occupational attainment (Filer (1985))
or occupational performance and success (Barrick and Mount (1991), Seibert and
Kraimer (2001)). Whether personality variables can also be used to understand
“micro”-behavior in economic games is however less clear.
In this paper, we discuss reasons in favor and against this assumption and
test in our own experiment, whether personality factors are useful in predicting
behavior in the trust game (Berg et al. (1995)). We can also use the trust game to
understand how personality measures fare relatively in predicting behavior when
situational constraints vary in strength.
The aim of this paper is exploratory, and due to this, our method is somewhat
non-standard: We use the NEO-PI-R (Costa and McCrae (1992)) to measure the
Big Five personality factors and link scores with behavior in a trust game, both
of trustor and trustee. To find the relevant predictors we use in our regressions
the method of backward stepwise elimination (Eid et al. (2010)). We do this on
two levels – first, on the level of the five factors, and then also on the level of sub-
scales. Here we follow an argument by Paunonen and Ashton (2001) who propose
1See for example Barrick and Mount (1991); Mueller and Plug (2006).
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to look at sub-scales (facets) as well for predicting behavior, because they are more
specific and therefore more apt to explain small-scale behavior.
To preview our results, first, we can show that behavior of player 1 is more
strongly determined by personality than behavior of player 2. Second, our analysis
of subscale-correlations can tell us something about the trust-game in general. We
discuss these results on the background of our aims, to get an idea of when person-
ality matters and whether and how using personality as an additional explanatory
variable is recommendable for (experimental) economists.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In section 2, we give
an overview of the literature on personality measurement. Then, we describe our
experimental design (section 3) and the personality measures (section 3.2) used in
more detail. Section 5.2 presents the results for player 1’s behavior and section
5.3 those for player 2’s behavior. Section 6 discusses the results and concludes.
2. Measurement of Personality
Personality psychology provides a large set of specific measures of potential
interest for economists. On the one hand, there are general models of personality,
comprising usually between four and seven general factors of personality (e.g.,
Goldberg (1981); Cloninger et al. (1993); Cattell and Schuerger (2003)). These
are measured with different scales, varying in the content of the factors and the
sub-factors measured. The most famous example is the NEO-PI-R measuring the
so called Big Five Personality Factors (Costa and McCrae (1992)). On the other
hand, there are more specific measures, capturing certain aspects of personality
like anxiousness or aggressiveness. Here, we focus on the general measures and use
the NEO-PI-R (Costa and McCrae (1992)), German: (Ostendorf and Angleitner
(2004)) to measure the Big Five personality factors.
Researchers in personality psychology discuss whether personality factors can
be expected to correlate strongly with real life outcomes and behavior, and whether
it would be problematic if this were not the case. Since Mischel (1968), many per-
sonality psychologists argue that there is a ceiling of a correlation of .3 between per-
sonality variables and real life outcomes, the so called .3 barrier (Mischel (1968);
see also McCrae (1982) for exceptions). Researchers that adhere to this ceiling
argument put forward that the situation is at least as or more important in de-
termining behavior and important life outcomes as is personality. Others (e.g.,
Ozer (1985)) however argue that .3-correlations are not so small and can have
important practical effects and that most social, psychological (and even medical)
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variables, like socioeconomic status or cognitive ability do on average not cor-
relate any stronger with important life outcomes. It is noteworthy that usually
the outcomes studied are larger-life outcomes, such as divorce, occupational or
educational attainment, and not “micro”-behaviors as trust-game behavior. An
exception to this is research in organizational behavior that links, for example,
locus of control or conscientiousness to individual performance, turnover decisions
etc. (e.g., Judge and Bono (2001); Allen et al. (2005); Dudley et al. (2006)). Most
researchers argue that personality influences outcomes in life not in a direct way,
but rather affects general tendencies to act, e.g., to continue an education or to be
persistent despite failures, which then influences the developmental path over the
life span.
We therefore do not expect to be able to explain behavior in the trust game
by a single personality factor. We do however think that if personality is indeed
influencing behavior, it should at least contribute somewhat to an explanation of
small-scale behavior, especially when the situation does not provide much guidance
on how to behave.
3. Experimental Design and Procedure
The experiment was conducted in the experimental laboratory of SFB 504 in
Mannheim. We had 138 subjects in total (57 male, 70 female, the remaining failed
to indicate their sex). All subjects participated in two sessions with one week in-
between. The experiment consisted of 12 independent sessions in the first week and
12 sessions in the second week. In total, the experiment lasted for about one hour
in the first and one hour in the second week. Subjects had filled in the personality
questionnaires before our experimental sessions, which took them about 2 hours.
We paid subjects at the very end of the experiment, i.e. after the session in the
second week. Part of these earnings were performance-based, and part was fixed:
both in week one and two they received a show-up fee of e5, and they received a
fixed amount of e14 for filling in the personality questionnaires. The personality
questionnaires were filed in on paper, while the games were programmed and
conducted with the software z-tree (Fischbacher (2007)). All subjects were paid
in cash and private. Subjects knew about the whole timing in advance. At the
beginning of each session they received instructions containing the curse of events
of the session. For each of the games and decisions instructions were distributed
and also read aloud in each part by the experimenter, and participants had a
chance to ask questions.
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3.1. The Trust Game. Players were randomly assigned to be either player 1, the
trustor, or player 2, the trustee. Two players were randomly matched together.
Both players got 10 units of an experimental currency. The trustor could first
decide whether or not to send units to player 2. If he sent x units (0 < x ≤ 10),
these units got tripled. Then player 2 got informed about the amount she received
and she could decide to send an amount y (y ≤ 10 + 3x) back to player 1 (these
units were not tripled). Therefore the payoffs for both players are determined by
(1) player 1 : 10− x + y player 2 : 10 + 3x− y.
At the end of the experiment the experimental currency was transformed into Euro
with an exchange rate of 1 Euro =0.3 ECU.
3.2. The Big Five. To measure personality we use the five-factor model or the
“Big Five” (Goldberg (1981), McCrae and Costa JR (2003))).
Table 1. The five factors and their facets (NEO-PI-R), acronyms in parenthesis
Factor Facets
Neuroticism (N) Anxiety (N1), Angry Hostility (N2), Depres-
sion (N3), Self-Consciousness (N4), Impulsive-
ness (N5), Vulnerability to Stress (N6)
Extraversion (E) Warmth (E1), Gregariousness (E2), Assertive-
ness (E3), Activity (E4), Excitement-Seeking
(E5), Positive Emotions (E6)
Openness to Experience (O) Fantasy (O1), Aesthetics (O2), Feelings (O3),
Actions (O4), Ideas (O5), Values (O6)
Agreeableness (A) Trust (A1), Straightforwardness (A2), Altruism
(A3), Compliance (A4), Modesty (A5), Tender-
Mindedness (A6)
Conscientiousness (C) Competence (C1), Order (C2), Dutiful-
ness (C3), Achievement-Striving (C4), Self-
Discipline (C5), Deliberation (C6)
This model organizes personality traits in five basic dimensions: neuroticism,
extraversion, openness to experience, agreeableness and conscientiousness.2 A list
of the personality dimensions and their facets measured by the Big Five model can
be found in table 1.
2There are other labels for the five factors, we use the names by Costa and McCrae (1992).
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We use the NEO PI-R (Costa and McCrae (1992)), German version (Osten-
dorf and Angleitner (2004)). It consists of 241 items which have to be rated on a
5-point-Likert-scale.
4. Behavioral Predictions
As this paper is exploratory in character, we do not test specific hypotheses
but rather explore how personality is related to behavior in the trust game. We
did however formulate some rather general predictions that we will explain in
the following. The basis for our predictions is on one hand the analysis of the
situation both players in the trust game are in. On the other hand, we rely on the
literature in personality psychology to predict which personality factors should be
most important for behavior of player 1 and of player 2 in the trust game.
First, we focus on the link between personality factors and behavior, i.e. we
discuss in what way a subject with a certain personality will behave in the trust
game.
Neuroticism refers to the tendency to experience negative emotions and feel-
ings, especially anxiety and general distress. Therefore we would expect that a
person with high neuroticism-scores is rather anxious and avoids the risk of not
getting money back.
Prediction 1. Higher levels on neuroticism will correlate with lower amounts sent
by player 1.
With respect to extraversion and openness to experience, we do not have
clear-cut predictions regarding behavior in the trust game.
Agreeableness is defined as being compassionate and cooperative. It is linked
to cooperative behavior (Volk et al. (2011); LePine and Van Dyne (2001)). This
leads to the following intuitive prediction:
Prediction 2. Higher levels on agreeableness will correlate with higher amounts
sent by player 1 and with higher relative amounts returned by player 2.
People high on conscientiousness act planned and not spontaneous, are dutiful
and self-disciplined. Therefore we could imagine that high levels of conscientious-
ness will lead to higher amounts sent by player 1 (being dutiful) if a norm for
sending is salient. As conscientiousness is also linked to rationality (D’Zurilla et
al. (2011); Witteman et al. (2009)) high levels of conscientiousness could as well
lead to lower amounts sent by player 1 (being more rational). For player 2, we
assume the norm of reciprocity to be salient and thus, controlling for player 1’s
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sending we expect trustors that are high on conscientiousness to follow this norm
dutifully, and thus send back relatively more.
Prediction 3. Higher levels on conscientiousness of player 1 could lead to more
or less sending. For player 2, we assume that high conscientiousness-scores lead
to higher relative returns.
The reason to select the trust game for our research is that it contains two
different situations (for player 1 and 2 respectively) that can be described in terms
of a distinction often made in personality psychology: the distinction between
weak and strong situations (Mischel (1977)). In weak situations, the behavioral
triggers stemming from the situation are weak, and therefore personality variables
can contribute significantly to an explanation of behavior. In strong situations on
the contrary, situational triggers of behavior are strong and therefore personality
variables will not contribute much to an explanation of behavior if player 1’s
behavior has been controlled for.
For player 2 in the trust game, the situation she finds herself in is relatively
clearly determined: Player 1 has either trusted her with a certain amount of
money or not, and now she has to decide how to react to this. As is known
from the experimental literature, reciprocity is a strong norm prevailing in this
context (e.g., Berg et al. (1995); McCabe et al. (1998); Fehr and Ga¨chter (2000);
McCabe et al. (2003)). Player 1 however faces a situation where norms or guidance
for behavior are not that clear. Personal tendency to trust or to take risks will
determine how much of the money he will send to player 2.
Prediction 4. First players find themselves in a rather weak situation, therefore
personality variables should contribute significantly to an explanation of behavior.
Second players are in a rather strong situation, therefore personality variables
should not contribute much to an explanation of behavior if player 1’s behavior has
been controlled for.
5. Results
5.1. Behavior in the Trust Game. Figure 1 shows the distribution of the
amount sent by player 1 in the trust game.
60 subjects played the trust game in the role of player 1, and the mean amount
sent by player 1 is 4.3. This is slightly below what is usually reported. Usual results
are that player 1 sends on average half of his endowment and trust is not repaid
by player 2 (e.g., Camerer (2003)).
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Figure 1. Trust – Amount Sent by Player 1
Returns show an absolute average of 5.9, and are strongly correlated with
offers (r = .736). Figures 2(a) shows absolute returns. The relation between
the amount sent by player 1 and the amount returned by player 2 can be found
in 2(b). The red line indicates where the amount sent is equal to the amount
returned. Above the red line, trust is repaid by player 2.
5.2. Personality measures and trustors behavior. Generally, we find reason-
able variance in our personality scales3, even though one might assume at least
with respect to some of the scales that a student population might be compa-
rably homogeneous. Scores on all five of the personality measures are normally
distributed (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of normality).
As a first step to test our predictions we calculate correlations of first player
behavior (and later second player behavior) with the personality factors. We report
correlations in the first column of table 2. This table also shows intercorrelations
of the personality measures.
As conjectured in predictions 1, 2 and 3, sending of player 1 correlates sig-
nificantly negative with neuroticism, and significantly positive with agreeableness
and conscientiousness.
Next we look at subscales (facets) and also calculate correlations here. We
only report significant correlations.
We analyze the facets of the three factors that correlate with trustor behavior,
neuroticism, agreeableness and conscientiousness. Anxiety (N1), angry hostility
3For descriptive statistics of the personality scales see table 7 in appendix B.1.
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(a) Amount Returned by Player 2
(b) Trustworthiness – Amounts sent and returned
(N2), and depression (N3) correlate significantly (negative) with sender behavior
among the subscales of neuroticism. Of the subscales of agreeableness, trust (A1)
correlates significantly positive with the amount sent by player 1, and so does
straightforwardness (A2).
Although having an intuitive appeal, altruism (A3) does not correlate with
behavior of the trustor. There is a discussion in the literature about other motives
than trust that are involved in trust game behavior; Cox (2004) points out that
not only trust and trustworthiness, but also altruistic preferences can account
for sending by player 1 or returning by player 2. From the personality variables
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Table 2. Correlations between x, the amount sent by player 1, and
the personality factors
x N E O A C
N -0.339∗∗∗ 1.000
0.009
E -0.052 -0.331∗∗ 1.000
0.697 0.011
O 0.199 -0.102 0.404∗∗∗ 1.000
0.134 0.446 0.002
A 0.284∗∗ -0.071 0.146 0.133 1.000
0.031 0.596 0.274 0.318
C -0.258∗ -0.210 0.233∗ 0.010 -0.078 1.000
0.050 0.113 0.078 0.938 0.561
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respec-
tively. Abbreviations: N = neuroticism, E = extraversion, O =
openness to experience, A = agreeableness, C = conscientiousness
Table 3. Correlations between x, the amount sent by player 1, and
the personality facets of neuroticism, agreeableness, conscientious-
ness
x
N1 Anxiety −0.377∗∗∗ (0.003)
N2 Angry Hostility −0.319∗∗ (0.015)
N3 Depression −0.280∗∗ (0.033)
N4 Self-Consciousness −0.211 (0.111)
N5 Impulsiveness −0.078 (0.559)
N6 Vulnerability to Stress −0.123 (0.358)
A1 Trust 0.370∗∗∗ (0.004)
A2 Straightforwardness 0.314∗∗ (0.016)
A3 Altruism 0.167 (0.210)
A4 Compliance 0.150 (0.262)
A5 Modesty −0.007 (0.958)
A6 Tender-Mindedness 0.172 (0.197)
C1 Competence 0.048 (0.720)
C2 Order −0.343∗∗ (0.008)
C3 Dutifulness −0.128 (0.340)
C4 Achievement-Striving −0.243∗ (0.066)
C5 Self-Discipline −0.203 (0.126)
C6 Deliberation −0.260∗∗ (0.049)
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involved in player 1’s decision, only trust, but not altruism has an influence on the
amount sent by the first player.
Of the subscales of conscientiousness, order (C2), achievement-striving (C4)
and deliberation (C6) correlate significantly negative with the amount sent by
player 1.
After presenting first results we turn to the regression analysis.
Here, we use a modeling approach that is often used in exploratory studies
(e.g., Eid et al. (2010)): Backward stepwise elimination of insignificant predictors.
In the first step we include all predictors that correlate with behavior of player
1 and some control variables in a regression. We then stepwise eliminate always
the least significant predictor until we get a model that consists only of significant
predictor variables. This exploratory way of modeling is indicated in our case
as most of the personality variables we study are inter-correlated. A model in-
cluding all potentially relevant personality variables therefore underestimates the
explanatory power of each of the variables, due to multicollinearity. By doing a
step-wise elimination of insignificant predictors, we reach a model where only the
most inclusive and important personality variables remain.
For the trustor we explain the amount sent in two different ways using the
Big Five personality variables: in the first approach we use the factors correlat-
ing individually with the behavior of the first player (table 2) and in the second
approach we use the facets of these factors, and again only the facets correlating
individually with the behavior of the first player (table 3).
Table 4 shows all four models (model I and II – factor-approach, model III and
IV – facet-approach). In model I, the factors neuroticism, agreeableness, and con-
scientiousness, together with the controls are included, stepwise elimination leads
to model II. In both models neuroticism and conscientiousness have a significant
negative impact on the amount sent and agreeableness a significant positive im-
pact. These models explain 23% to 24% of the variance in the amount sent by
the first player. Using facets, there are no significant predictors in model III. In
model VI, all insignificant predictors have been excluded, significant predictors
are anxiety (N1), trust (A1), and order (C2) again signed as before: a negative
impact of the neuroticism- and conscientiousness-facets and a positive impact of
the agreeableness-facet. This model explains a slightly larger part of the variance
in player 1’s behavior than the factor-models, around 26%.
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Table 4. Regression on x, the amount sent by player 1
Variable model I model II model III model IV
N −0.400∗∗∗ −0.390∗∗∗
(0.024/0.004) (0.021/0.002)
N1 −0.232 −0.260∗∗
(0.125/0.211) (0.082/0.034)
N2 0.024
(0.130/0.890)
N3 −0.068
(0.132/0.718)
A 0.246∗∗ 0.231∗
(0.024/0.043) (0.023/0.052)
A1 0.208 0.281∗∗
(0.116/0.174) (0.091/0.021)
A2 0.202
(0.108/0.136)
C −0.353∗∗∗ −0.323∗∗∗
(0.020/0.007) (0.019/0.009)
C2 −0.240 −0.277∗∗
(0.099/0.115) (0.077/0.020)
C4 −0.050
(0.123/0.768)
C6 −0.016
(0.108/0.921)
age −0.116 −0.136
(0.108/0.331) (0.110/0.271)
sex −0.043 0.001
(0.970/0.745) (0.997/0.990)
n 58 58 58 58
R2 0.2962 0.2814 0.3472 0.2972
adj. R2 0.2286 0.2414 0.2083 0.2581
Note: beta, SE/p-value in parenthesis; *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and
1% level respectively.
Anxiety is defined4 as the level of free floating anxiety and has been linked to
risk averse behavior in different domains5, so it is intuitive that this facet has a
negative impact on the amount sent by player 1. Order is the degree of personal
4All facet-definitions following Costa and McCrae (1992).
5Nicholson et al. (2005) analyze personality and risk propensity in different domains and find
anxiety being linked to less risk taking in recreation, career, and safety.
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organization and has also a negative impact on the amount sent by player 1. The
positive influence of trust highlights again that the trust game is indeed about
trust: trust being defined as the belief in the sincerity and good intentions of
others has a positive impact on the amount sent by player 1.
5.3. Trustee Behavior. We now turn to the behavior of the second player. As
described before, there is one clear difference between predicting first player’s
behavior and predicting second player’s behavior: behavior of player 2 will most
probably be guided by reciprocal incentives, i.e., what the first player has sent to
the second player will matter. We thus have a strong situation here, as opposed to
the weak situation in which first players find themselves in. In line with the general
search for interactions of personality variables and the environment in personality
psychology, our main question is whether personality variables predict beyond
“material”, situational characteristics, or whether it is only player 1’s behavior
that predicts the responses of player 2.
We start again with correlations. If we take data of all trustees, the only and
highly significant predictor of player 2’s behavior is the amount player 1 sent to her
(0.731, p = 0.000), we find no correlation at all between behavior of player 2 and
any of the personality factors or of the sub-factors, i.e., the situation determines
behavior stronger than do personality variables.
Table 5. Regression on y, the amount returned by player 2
Variable model I model II
sent 0.737∗∗∗ 0.731∗∗∗
(0.169/0.000) (0.160/0.000)
Sex −0.56
(1.322/0.546)
Age 0.049
(0.280/0.592)
n 61 64
R2 0.540 0.534
adj. R2 0.516 0.527
Note: beta, SE/p-value in parenthesis; *, **, ***
indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level
respectively.
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Including these variables in a regression on the return of player 2, the results
in table 5 again highlight that only the amount that player 1 has sent to player 2
explains the amount player 2 returns.6
In an attempt to give personality variables the best opportunity to have an
effect, we look at only part of our sample, namely those second players who received
high offers in the trust game, where high offers are defined7 as offers of at least five.
We are aware of the fact that analyzing this sub-sample leads to a small number
of observations, but due to the exploratory character of this study we still do this
analysis.
As expected, personality factors have some influence on behavior in the case
where player 1’s sending has been reasonable and fair: On the factor-level we still
find no correlations, but on facet-level modesty (A5) correlates negatively with the
amount returned (−0.415, p = 0.035), while competence (C1) correlates positive
(0.399, p = 0.044).
A positive relationship between a conscientiousness-facet is in line with pre-
diction 3. This is also generally coherent with the definition of conscientiousness
being defined as the degree of organization, control and goal directed behavior.
The facet competence measures the belief in own self efficacy which could intu-
itively be linked to higher amounts returned. Someone believing in his self efficacy
may takes things into his own hands, that is returns higher amounts. In contrast,
a negative relationship between modesty and the amount return is very unintu-
itive. Modesty is defined as a tendency to play down own achievements and be
humble. Because of the small sample size we had a closer look at this result. A
visual inspection and detection of extremes demonstrated that some subjects with
low scores on modesty returned very high amounts. Analyzing these observations
more detailed we declared two of the observations as outliers. After dropping these
two observations there is no longer a significant correlation between modesty and
the amount returned. Therefore, modesty is not included into the regression (see
table 6).
Including the facet competence in a regression together with the amount sent
by the first player and controls for age and sex, in the full model again only
the amount sent is significant, and 17% of the variance is explained, while after
step-wise exclusion of insignificant predictors, the amount sent by the first player
6Sometimes it is argued that one should only analyze those second players that received
positive amounts from the first player, because players receiving zero are forced to sent back
zero. Repeating our analysis only with subjects that received strictly positive amounts we find
structurally the same results as in table 5.
7This definition of high conveys the definition of Blanco et al. (2011) for high offers in an
ultimatum game.
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Table 6. Only for high amounts received: regression on y, the
amount returned by player 2
Variable model I model II
sent 0.449∗∗ 0.497∗∗
(0.776/0.048) (0.561/0.004)
C1 0.222
(0.436/0.311)
Sex −0.063
(3.140/0.756)
Age 0.090
(0.507/0.646)
n 25 31
R2 0.310 0.247
adj. R2 0.172 0.221
Note: beta, SE/p-value in parenthesis; *, **, ***
indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level
respectively.
remains the only significant predictor in the model, and the model explains 22%
of the variance.
So even in this case where we gave personality its best chance: the situation
determines behavior.
6. Discussion
To answer the question to what extent personality can contribute to explain
small-scale economic behavior we decided to use the trust game as an example.
There are other studies relating the trust game or trust in general to per-
sonality. Two studies relate the Machiavellian personality test to the trust game:
Gunnthorsdottir et al. (2002) use a modified trust game and Burks et al. (2003) the
standard trust game. Having hypotheses about both trust and trustworthiness,
related to scoring high on Machiavellism, Gunnthorsdottir et al. (2002) find that
subjects high on Machiavellism are less trustworthy, where Burks et al. (2003) find
that high Machiavellism predicts lack of trust, but not trustworthiness.
Fahr and Irlenbusch (2008) use the Big Five personality model, measured by
Catell’s 16 PF-R, to analyze trust between representatives of organizations. To
study this question they use a modified trust game. To implement their organiza-
tional setting players were in groups of four and had to decide as a representative
of their own group. They found a link between anxiety, being linked to risk averse
BIG FIVE AND SMALL-SCALE ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 15
behavior, and trustor behavior and anxiety, on the other hand being liked to co-
operative behavior, to trustee’s decision. Our study strengthens the result that
anxiety is linked to distrust. Using another measure of the Big Five and the
standard trust game we find that trust is negatively related to anxiety (see table
4).
The research focus of Ben-Ner and Halldorsson (2010) concentrates on un-
derstanding trusting and trustworthiness. They use many different measures, and
among others the Big Five factors (measured by the NEO-FFI), but to define trust
and trustworthiness they use on the one hand survey questions and on the other
hand a modified trust game (a repeated variant).
Our exploratory study had two main aims: First, we wanted to test whether
personality variables can be used to predict “micro”-level behavior in economic
games, where we use the example of the trust game. Next, we hypothesized that
strong situations allow for less influence of personality factors than weak situations,
and that first players in a trust game are in a weak situation, while second players
face a strong situation.
Our results confirm most of our general and some of the more specific predic-
tions: First, we do find that personality variables contribute to an explanation of
behavior. Trustor behavior can be explained to a large extent using personality
variables. This is good news especially for personality psychologists, who so far
seldom validate their personality scales with the help of clear-cut behavioral exper-
iments. It is also good news for all those experimental and behavioral economists
that now start to use personality measures in their experiments. But, we also
confirm the notion of strong and weak situations found in personality psychol-
ogy: First player’s behavior can be explained to a large extent (up to 26% of the
variance) using personality variables, while second player’s behavior is explained
by the situation. This is essentially good news for standard economics, as this
means that if incentives or behavioral norms are clear and strongly point into a
specific direction, most people, independent of their personality, will react to these
incentives, and predictably so.
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Appendix A. Trust Game
Instructions. These instructions have been translated into English from the Orig-
inal German.
In this game you will play together with one other person in the laboratory.
You are either player A or player B. This will be randomly determined by the
computer. The other person (A or B) you will play together will also be randomly
determined by the computer.
Both player A and B receive 10 experimental currency units (ECU). Player
A can decide whether he would like to sent taler to player B and if so, how many
(only integer amounts are possible). The amount of ECU that player A sents to
player B is tripled. Therefore player B receives 3 units for each unit sent by player
A. Player B can then decide whether she wants to return ECU to player A and if
so, how many. These units will not be tripled. This is the end of this game.
The experimental currency is converted into Euros as follows: 1 ECU = 0.30
Euro.
If you now got questions regarding these instructions, raise your hand and
one of the experimenters will come to answer your questions.
Appendix B. Big Five
Table 7. Descriptive Statistics of the Personality Scales
Variable n Mean SD Min Max
Neuroticism 126 91.985 23.666 27 155
Extraversion 126 116.020 21.564 32 158
Openness 126 124.478 16.781 72 180
Agreeableness 126 109.925 18.700 67 152
Conscientiousness 126 116.294 21.636 58 166
B.1. Descriptive Statistics of the Personality Scales.
B.2. Factors and Facets.
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Table 8. Names of the Factors and Facets
N Neuroticism N1 Anxiety
N2 Angry Hostility
N3 Depression
N4 Self-Consciousness
N5 Impulsiveness
N6 Vulnerability to Stress
E Extraversion E1 Warmth
E2 Gregariousness
E3 Assertiveness
E4 Activity
E5 Excitement-Seeking
E6 Positive Emotions
O Openness to Experience O1 Fantasy
O2 Aesthetics
O3 Feelings
O4 Actions
O5 Ideas
O6 Values
A Agreeableness A1 Trust
A2 Straightforwardness
A3 Altruism
A4 Compliance
A5 Modesty
A6 Tender-Mindedness
C Conscientiousness C1 Competence
C2 Order
C3 Dutifulness
C4 Achievement-Striving
C5 Self-Discipline
C6 Deliberation
